Nikolai Yudenich: a general who never knew defeat. Unknown commanders of Russia. General Yudenich
The name of General Nikolai Yudenich in Soviet historiography was usually associated exclusively with the white movement. It was his troops on the outskirts of Petrograd that almost decided the outcome of the civil war - and not at all in favor of the Bolsheviks. But few people know that General Yudenich was also an outstanding commander who glorified Russian weapons in the First World War. Yudenich’s personality is also unique in that during the war years he did not suffer a single defeat.
Biography and activities of Nikolai Yudenich
He was born in 1862 in Moscow. The family was prosperous, educated and law-abiding. My father served as the director of a land surveying school and had the rank of collegiate adviser. The mother was a cousin of the famous author of the dictionary, Vladimir Dahl. The boy had a cheerful character and cheerful disposition. At the same time, he remained diligent and disciplined. He studied at the Moscow city gymnasium. He graduated from high school with honors.
He continued his studies at the famous Alexander Military School. Studying was easy. The young man realized that his choice was correct. In 1882, newly appointed lieutenant Nikolai Yudenich went to serve in the Lithuanian Guards regiment, which was located in Warsaw. Soon he was transferred to the Turkestan Military District, already as a company commander. Education continued at the Nikolaev Academy under the General Staff. Yudenich received his baptism of fire during the Pamir expedition of 1894. He also received his first award - the Order of St. Stanislaus.
Yudenich’s personal life was settled thanks to his acquaintance with Alexandra Zhemchuzhnikova, with whom they soon got married. The marriage turned out to be strong. The calm, balanced character of the husband was perfectly complemented by the lively, cheerful disposition of his wife. Guests loved this hospitable couple and willingly visited their home. From the memoirs of his contemporaries, Yudenich appears as a man of short stature, stocky, with an attentive, studying gaze, taciturn, easy to use, who quickly found a common language with a variety of people.
By the beginning of the war, he was already a colonel. Yudenich's regiment was in the thick of things. Yudenich was wounded twice and awarded the golden Arms of St. George for unparalleled bravery, and received the rank of major general. At court, Yudenich was not particularly favored for his sharpness and independence of judgment. During World War I, Yudenich commanded the Caucasian Army. Russian troops capture Erzurum, a Turkish fortress of great strategic importance. For this military success, Yudenich received the Order of St. George, the highest award of the Russian Empire.
Yudenich did not accept liberal reforms in the army after the February Revolution. He stood in strong opposition to the Provisional Government. He was removed from all positions. In 1918, the Yudenichs moved to Petrograd and lived there semi-underground. In 1919 they managed to travel to neighboring Finland. Members of the so-called The Russian Committee offers him to lead the white movement in the north-west of the country. He could not stand aside in such a difficult time for Russia - as a military general and as a patriot.
General Kolchak appoints Yudenich commander-in-chief of all armed forces opposing the Bolsheviks. The allies willingly allocated money under the name of Yudenich. In the fall of 1919, Yudenich's well-equipped army approached Petrograd. However, Trotsky called for reinforcements. The remnants of Yudenich's army returned to Estonia and were disarmed there. Thus ended the last tragic campaign of General Yudenich.
In 1923, Yudenich and his wife came to London. There he was greeted as a hero. There was no end to the journalists. Everyone expected revelations or loud political statements from him. They didn't follow. Yudenich remained stubbornly silent. The family settled in the south of France, in Nice. The general finally retired from politics and became a private citizen. I wrote my memoirs. The only thing he did in exile was to head the Society of Devotees of Russian History. He died of pulmonary tuberculosis in the fall of 1933.
- His wife survived Yudenich by almost thirty years and died there, near Nice, when she was already over 90.
The civil war that engulfed the lands of the peoples of the Russian Empire after the February and October armed coups, as its results show only externally, only in words resembled a social revolution. Rather, it was a form of religious and political genocide. It is a mistake to think that genocide is limited only to the physical extermination of a people. The regime established by the mercenaries of American bankers Lenin and Trotsky had to fight to transform all of humanity into a submissive community, devoid of racial and national differences. Instead of all-human brotherhood in Christ, where there is neither a Greek nor a Jew, the Russians were offered an extreme form of Nazism - internationalism. In the name of this, the Russian people had to forget their native history. Including the military history of the Fatherland enslaved by the Bolsheviks.
The military spirit of a nation is like the body's immune system. Deprived of the military history of the Fatherland, the people are like a person with AIDS. This is what the first tragic months of the Great Patriotic War proved. Stalin understood this problem perfectly. During the Patriotic War, Stalin introduced many famous names into circulation. One after another, films about the exploits of Minin and Pozharsky, Suvorov and Ushakov, Nakhimov and Skobelev were released on the screens of the country. However, the rehabilitation of Russian military history begun by Stalin was incomplete. With the rare exception of the hero of the Lutsk breakthrough, Alexey Brusilov, who went over to the Bolshevik side, the names of those who covered themselves with glory on the fields of the last war, which the Russian Empire waged on the verge of its destruction, remained under an unspoken ban. A special place among them is occupied by the brilliant Russian commander, infantry general Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich.
Today the name of the brave polar explorer and brilliant commander Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak has been rehabilitated, and the names of generals Kornilov and Denikin are on everyone’s lips. Dressed in a white Circassian coat, Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel ceased to be a black baron. But the name of Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich still remains in the shadows.
The writer and researcher Cherkasov-Georgievsky, in his work dedicated to Adjutant General Yudenich, cites a statement from an officer who served under him: “Silence, that was the dominant quality of my then boss.”
As a rule, a person who has experienced a major personal or major public drama seeks to speak out. With rare exceptions, the generals who commanded the defeated armies strive to justify their true role in the defeat that befell their troops. But Yudenich, who lived in the French Riviera for thirteen languid emigrant years, did not leave a single line behind him. But any psychologist will tell you that silence is the most difficult form of experiencing what has happened.
Nikolai Nikolaevich was born in Moscow, on Znamenka. Not far from the third Alexander School. His father came from the nobility of the Minsk province, and was in the civil service in the insignificant sixth grade with the rank of collegiate councilor. But apparently the very atmosphere of the place obliged high school student Kolya Yudenich to choose a different path. And after graduating from the Moscow City Gymnasium, he entered the Alexander School, which trained future officers of the Russian infantry.
Having brilliantly completed his school course, Yudenich received assignment to the privileged Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment, stationed in the capital of the Kingdom of Poland, in Warsaw. However, Yudenich prefers to command a platoon and then a company in the hot sands of the Turkestan Military District. Where quite recently Russian bayonets eliminated the shameful practice of the slave trade. Since 1884, Lieutenant Yudenich became a student at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. He finishes it in the first category and again receives a forest appointment as an adjutant of the Corps Headquarters in Warsaw. But instead he returns to Turkestan to command an infantry battalion. A little later, within the walls of the same Academy, Mikhail Alekseev and Anton Denikin will study at the same faculty, and Lavr Georgievich Kornilov will study at the exploration department. Subsequently, it is they who will form the backbone of the shameful Military Lodge, and will carry out the February conspiracy of the generals that destroyed Russia. To the credit of Nikolaev Academy graduate Nikolai Yudenich, he will not take part in these matters.
At the beginning of the Japanese War, Yudenich, by that time already eight years old as a colonel, was offered a general’s position, but still in the same Turkestan, which became an absolutely rear district. But he would prefer to go to Manchuria with his 18th Infantry Regiment. His finest hour would strike near Mugden, when he would lead a bayonet attack in front of the regimental chain with his saber drawn. However, this was the way of life and death of a Russian officer. For valor in the Battle of Mukden, Colonel Yudenich was awarded the St. George’s Arms with the inscription “For Bravery.” For his distinction in the Japanese War, he was also awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, III degree, and St. Stanislav, I degree with swords and promoted to major general.
In January 1913, Yudenich, promoted to lieutenant general, was appointed chief of staff in the Caucasus Military District. And a year and a half later, after the Sarajevo assassination attempt, Europe entered the First World War. Türkiye, bordering Russia in the Caucasus, enters the war on the side of the German coalition.
At the beginning of January 1915, the superior forces of the 3rd Turkish Army attacked the regiments of the Russian Caucasian Army near Sorokamysh. Mountain warfare has always been considered a particularly difficult type of warfare. Mountain ranges cut the united front of armies, and even with modern technology, communication between units is stable only with the presence of satellite systems. In Yudenich’s time there was none of this. Suffice it to remember that the disaster in East Prussia, which befell the Russian armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf in August 1914, was caused by a hundred-kilometer gap between their flanks, in the absence of communication between Russian headquarters. And this is on the plain.
Yudenich in the mountains, using about three dozen radio stations, organized relay communication lines for the first time in the world. In the battle for Sorokamysh, the Turkish army, which outnumbered the Russian troops, lost 2/3 of its strength. 80% of these losses were classified as irrecoverable.
Such was the level of Russian military science. The Civil War led, among other things, to the fact that the entire flower of the Russian officers, the entire combat and staff personnel, who had collected and concentrated all the invaluable experience of the World War, was physically destroyed or ended up in exile. Despite all Stalin’s efforts to make up for the low qualifications of his commanders with numerical superiority and technical equipment of the Red Army, the first two years of the Patriotic War revealed the complete inability of “nuggets” with a four-year education, like non-commissioned officer Zhukov, to control troops at a distance. Stalin's commanders will master this skill. The Soviet Union will defeat the most powerful army in the world, but the combat training of Stalin's generals will cost several million soldiers' lives.
And in 1916, led by Yudenich, the Caucasian army accomplished a feat equal to that of the capture of Izmail. In the conditions of a mountain winter, during the Erzurum offensive operation, his regiments broke through the Turkish front and stormed the impregnable mountain fortress of Erzurum. Turkish losses amounted to 66 thousand people. Yudenich's losses were 2,300 soldiers. For the Erzurum operation, Yudenich was awarded the Order of St. George, II class, this was the highest award received by any Russian general received on the fields of World War II.
Yudenich's operational subordination was the Black Sea Fleet, which in the 1916 campaign was headed by 44-year-old Vice Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak. The Black Sea Fleet carried out a series of brilliant operations in the interests of the Primorsky Front of the Caucasian Army, which was advancing towards the strategically important Turkish port of Trebizond. Kolchak, like Yudenich, first developed modern principles of landing operations technology, including the use of specially built landing craft. And carrier ships to support the landing troops. It should be noted that the Turks were not wild Asians, poorly trained in military affairs. Turkey's military equipment was supplied by the advanced German military industry. German officers and generals served as military advisers in the Sultan's army.
So, in the spring-summer campaign of 1915 on the Galipoli Peninsula, which blocked the entrance to the Dardanelle Strait, the Turkish army, despite the numerical superiority of British ground forces and the complete dominance of the British fleet, heroically repelled a large-scale landing operation of the Entente, developed with the personal participation of the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Sir Winston Churchill. And their persistence cost Churchill his ministerial chair.
In the 1917 campaign, Yudenich was awaited by the Bosphorus landing operation, which he and Kolchak had prepared in vain. A marine division, staffed by St. George's cavaliers, was preparing for the landing. The victory of Russia was inevitable, Yudenich was expected to receive the shoulder straps of a field marshal, and the St. George Cross of the 1st class with a star, like the great Suvorov, Kutuzov and Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky. But it was the inevitability of Russian victory that forced the United States and Britain to put into action the secret levers that led to the February and October coups, and then to the Civil War.
It is generally accepted that during the February conspiracy of the generals, the only commanders loyal to the sovereign were the commander of the 3rd cavalry corps, Count Keller, and the chief of staff of the guards cavalry, General Winkler, who sent the emperor a corresponding telegram on behalf of their superior Khan Huseyn Nakhichevan.
R Nikolai Nikolaevich was born on July 18, 1862 in Moscow into the family of an official - a collegiate adviser. At the age of nineteen, he graduated from the 3rd Alexander Military School and was sent to serve in the Lithuanian Life Guards Regiment. He then served in various garrisons of the country and, having received the rank of lieutenant, he was sent for further study to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff.
T Study at the academy continued for three years, and in 1887 Yudenich graduated with the first category with a direction to work on the General Staff.
P Having received the rank of captain, he was appointed senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 14th Army Corps of the Warsaw Military District. In 1892, Yudenich was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and in 1896 to colonel. He was transferred to the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, commanded a battalion, was the chief of staff of a division, and then, already in the Vilna Military District, the 18th Infantry Regiment.
TO When the Russo-Japanese War began, his regiment, which was part of the 5th Infantry Brigade of the 6th East Siberian Division, was transferred to the Far East. His regiment distinguished itself in the battle of Mukden, for which the regiment's personnel received a special insignia attached to their headgear. Yudenich himself was awarded a golden weapon for this battle with the inscription “For bravery.”
IN In June 1905, he was promoted to the rank of major general and appointed commander of the 2nd brigade of the 5th rifle division. His bravery and courage were awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class, and St. Stanislav, 1st class, with swords. During the war, he was seriously wounded and was sent to the hospital.
IN In 1907, after treatment, Yudenich returned to duty and was appointed Quartermaster General of the Kazan Military District.
IN In 1913, he became chief of staff of the Caucasian Military District and in the same year was promoted to lieutenant general. In this post, Nikolai Nikolaevich often took part in military-diplomatic missions. He closely observed events in Iran and Turkey, as well as in Afghanistan.
IN At the beginning of 1914, serious disagreements arose between Russia and England regarding Iran, and Yudenich received an order from the General Staff to prepare several military units for entry into Iran. After one of the incidents provoked by Shuster, an American adviser to the Iranian government on financial issues, Russian troops entered the northern part of Iran. The Russian government demanded that Iran resign the American, threatening otherwise a military campaign against Tehran. Iran was forced to accept the ultimatum.
WITH With the outbreak of the First World War, the situation in the Caucasus became more complicated. The conflict with Turkey greatly complicated the position of Russia, which was fighting against Germany and Austria-Hungary. But the Turks decided to take advantage of the situation and carry out their long-nurtured plans to secede from Russia the Caucasus, Crimea and the territories in the Volga and Kama valleys where the Tatar population lived.
T Turkey joined the Central Bloc coalition, concluding an agreement with Germany on the second day after the declaration of war. A copy of the German-Turkish agreement was sent to Yudenich in early August. At the end of September 1914, Turkey closed the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to merchant ships of the Entente countries. The following month, the Turkish fleet shelled Odessa and other Russian ports.
IN In November 1914, the Entente countries officially declared war on Turkey: November 2 - Russia, November 5 - England, and the next day - France.
IN In November 1914, on the basis of the Caucasian Military District, the Caucasian Army was formed and deployed, headed by Adjutant General I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov. Lieutenant General N.N. Yudenich was appointed chief of staff of the army. The Russian army deployed over an area of 720 kilometers. The main forces of the Russian army - 120 battalions, 127 hundreds with 304 guns - were deployed on the line from Batumi to Sarykamysh. They were opposed by the 3rd Turkish Army under the command of Hasan Izet Pasha, consisting of 130 battalions, almost 160 squadrons with 270-300 guns and concentrated in the Erzurum region. The Turkish headquarters was headed by the German General von Schellendorff. The forces on both sides were approximately equal.
P The first priority tasks of Yudenich’s headquarters was to develop a plan for a future offensive operation, and at the beginning, Nikolai Nikolaevich at a meeting of the command staff proposed limiting himself to active defense and conducting combat reconnaissance along the border. They took into account both the mountain theater of military operations and the weather - heavy winter snowfalls, which hampered the advance of troops. In addition, in order to carry out an offensive operation, it was necessary to form reserves.
E The proposal was supported. On November 15, reconnaissance detachments of the 1st Caucasian Corps, immediately occupying the border mountain lines, began to advance to Erzurum. The next day, the main forces of the corps crossed the border, but two days later they were attacked by units of the 9th and 11th Turkish corps, and, fearing that their right flank would be bypassed, they retreated to the border. With the advent of severe winter at the end of November, fighting virtually ceased.
IN In early December, Yudenich received news that War Minister Enver Pasha had taken command of the 3rd Turkish Army. Deciding that the Turks were moving to active offensive operations, Yudenich ordered to strengthen reconnaissance and combat duty, strengthen their positions and put reserves on combat readiness. His intuition did not let him down, and on December 9, 1914, Turkish troops went on the offensive. The Russian command also learned that before the offensive, Enver Pasha personally toured the troops and addressed them with the following words: “Soldiers, I visited all of you. I saw that your feet were bare and there were no greatcoats on your shoulders. But the enemy standing opposite you is afraid of you. Soon you will advance and enter the Caucasus. There you will find food and wealth. The entire Muslim world looks with hope at your efforts.”
U At the beginning of the offensive, the Turkish troops were deprived of the effect of surprise, which they were counting on, thanks to well-organized reconnaissance in the Russian troops. The Turks unsuccessfully tried to attack and encircle the Oltyn detachment. During these hostilities, there was an episode when two Turkish divisions mistook each other for enemy troops and started a battle between themselves, which lasted about six hours. Losses in both amounted to two thousand people. 
IN
During the military operations, N.N. Yudenich commanded the troops of the 1st Caucasian and 2nd Turkestan Corps, and then replaced commander Vorontsov-Dashkov, who was summoned to Headquarters. Having taken the entire army under his command, Yudenich also did a good job of managing it, continuing to crush the Turkish troops. The French Ambassador to Russia M. Paleologue wrote at that time that “the Russian Caucasian army performs amazing feats there every day.”
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The 1st and 29th Turkish infantry divisions, which approached the village of Bardus on the evening of December 11, moved towards Sarykamysh without stopping. Enver Pasha, not knowing that the 10th Corps, instead of the planned turn from Olta to the east, was carried away by the pursuit of the Oltyn detachment, sent the 32nd Division also to Sarykamysh. However, due to frost and snow drifts, she was unable to get there and stopped in Bardus. Here, together with the 28th Infantry Division of the 9th Corps, she had to cover the communication routes, which were threatened by the 18th Turkestan Rifle Regiment advancing from the village of Yenikey.
T However, the 9th and 10th Corps, which bypassed the Russian flank, reached the line of the villages of Arsenyan and Kosor. At the same time, a detachment that broke through from the village of Khopa immediately occupied the city of Ardahan. The 11th Corps fought on the line Maslagat, Ardi.
IN At this time, the Sarykamysh detachment was headed by the assistant commander of the Caucasian Army, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky. Having guessed the enemy's plan, he decided to defend the Sarykamysh base and sent 20 battalions, 6 hundreds and 36 guns there. The most mobile units were supposed to reach their destination on December 13. The organization of defense was entrusted to Colonel of the General Staff I.S. Bukretov, who was passing through from Tiflis. At his disposal were two militia squads, two operational railway battalions, reserve troops, two companies of riflemen of the 2nd Turkestan Corps, two three-inch guns and 16 heavy machine guns.
T The soldiers, exhausted from marching in a snowstorm along snow-covered roads, moved slowly. The guards, sent by order of General Yudenich on a sleigh, at the end of December 12, detained them 8 km west of Sarykamysh. At dawn the next day, the enemy's 17th and 29th divisions launched an attack directly on Sarykamysh. The Russians defended themselves quite skillfully, using mainly machine-gun fire. Soon reinforcements approached them - the Sarykamysh detachment - and the village was defended. But the enemy did not give up hope of capturing Sarykamysh, despite heavy losses - only the 29th Turkish division during the offensive reached 50 percent of its strength. However, by noon on December 15, the entire 10th Turkish Corps was concentrated at Sarykamysh. The encirclement ring, not without the help of local Kurds, has almost closed. The operation plan conceived by the Turkish commander-in-chief seemed to be coming true. Meanwhile, thanks to the measures taken by the headquarters of the Caucasian Army, the Russian forces at Sarykamysh were increasingly arriving. They already had here more than 22 battalions, 8 hundreds, more than 30 guns, almost 80 machine guns against 45 Turkish battalions. And on this day all Turkish attacks were repelled.
TO On the evening of December 16, a large concentration of Turkish forces was noticed in the forest, and they also managed to capture a Turk who was carrying an order addressed to the commander of the 10th Corps. From the order, the Russian command learned about the night attack on the village being prepared by the Turkish command. It started around 11 pm. The Turks began to press out the Russian troops who occupied the heights of the Eagle's Nest, the station and the bridge on the highway, since food and ammunition warehouses were located behind it. At first they were successful, and the central part of the village was captured.
N On the morning of the next day (December 17), a series of counterattacks carried out on the orders of General Yudenich, who arrived at the command post, managed to contain the advance of the Turks. On the same day, Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich took command of the entire Russian army.
ABOUT Appreciating the situation, he decided to launch a simultaneous attack with the main forces from the front on Sarykamysh, Ardahan and Olty and bypassing detachments to the rear of the enemy. Success was supposed to be achieved through a secret regrouping of units of the 39th Infantry Division, the 1st and 2nd Kuban Plastun brigades, as well as two artillery divisions approaching from Kars. He understood that careful planning was required for the upcoming offensive, especially from the point of view of coordinating the efforts of the involved forces and means, and implementing camouflage along the advance routes. These issues were resolved in the remaining time by staff officers and heads of military branches and services.
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December, the Russians unexpectedly attacked it for the enemy. During the offensive, the 9th Turkish Corps operating at Sarykamysh was surrounded, the 154th Infantry Regiment penetrated deep into the Turkish defenses and captured the corps commander and all three division commanders with headquarters. The remnants of the defeated units were captured and their material was captured. The 30th and 31st Turkish infantry divisions of the 10th Corps, having suffered heavy losses, began a hasty retreat to Bardus. The Siberian Cossack brigade, reinforced by the Ardagan detachment, acting together with the Oltyn detachment, defeated the Turkish troops occupying the city of Ardagan, capturing up to a thousand prisoners and many trophies.
T Turkish units launched a counterattack from the Bardus area to the flank and rear of the Sarykamysh detachment, but it was successfully repelled, and in a night battle, Russian troops captured two thousand Turkish soldiers - the remnants of the 32nd division. By order of Yudenich, the main forces of the Sarykamysh detachment went on the offensive. Despite the fierce resistance of the Turkish troops - it even came to bayonet attacks - the troops moved forward, advancing in deep snow.
R The Russian command decided to bypass the left wing of the Turkish army, which was entrenched in a mountainous position west of the village of Ketek. The order for this difficult maneuver was received by the 18th Turkestan Rifle Regiment with four mountain guns. He had to overcome 15 km of mountainous terrain. With difficulty paving the way, often carrying heavy guns in parts and ammunition on their hands, this regiment advanced. When he appeared in the rear of the 11th Turkish Corps, the enemy retreated in panic.
IN On the night of December 29, the Turks began to retreat to Olty. The Russians began to pursue the enemy, but after traveling 8 km they were stopped by heavy artillery fire. Nevertheless, the 2nd Orenburg Cossack Battery boldly turned around in the open and returned fire. The arrows were dispersed to the right and left of the highway. The Turks, preempting the bypass of their flanks, retreated 3-4 km. The coming night stopped the battle.
U Three attacks were resumed, and soon the tenacity of the Turks was completely broken. They fled through Olty to Noriman and It, along the Sivrichay valley, and many simply to the mountains. Prisoners and guns were captured.
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TO On January 5, 1915, Russian troops, having crossed the state border, reached the border of the villages of It, Ardi, Dayar. The Sarykamysh operation, during which the enemy lost more than 90 thousand people, ended in victory for the Russian troops. Z and for his skillful leadership of the troops, N.N. Yudenich was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, and was promoted to infantry general. More than a thousand soldiers and officers of the Caucasian Army were also nominated for awards. AND Thus, the Caucasian Army transferred military operations to Turkish territory. According to General Yudenich, the main efforts were concentrated in the zone of action of the 4th Caucasian Corps - 30 infantry battalions and 70 cavalry squadrons. These forces were not enough for large-scale operations, so to move forward, the tactics of surprise raids by small detachments were developed. And she justified herself. By mid-June, the corps reached Arnis and created a continuous position adjacent to Lake Van. The center and right flank of the army occupied the main passes and reliably covered the Sarykamysh, Oltyn and Batumi directions. |
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On the Caucasian front. General N.N. Yudenich at an artillery observation post |
WITH Trying to seize the initiative, the Turkish command began to pull up reserves to this area, and soon the chief of staff of the army, German Major G. Guse, went with a group of officers for reconnaissance in order to clarify on the spot the starting position for the upcoming offensive. This was immediately reported to Yudenich by intelligence officers.
9
July, the Turkish group, numbering more than 80 battalions of infantry and cavalry, struck in the Melazgert direction, trying to break through the defenses of the flank units of the 4th Caucasian Corps and cut off its communications. Russian troops were forced to retreat to a line north of the Alashkert Valley. In addition, Turkish sabotage detachments were operating in their rear.
G General Yudenich ordered the urgent formation of a consolidated detachment, the command of which was entrusted to General Baratov. The detachment included 24 infantry battalions, 36 hundred cavalry and about 40 guns. He was entrusted with the task of striking on the left flank to the rear of the Turks. Then, together with the 4th Caucasian Corps, the detachment was supposed to encircle the enemy in the Karakilis-Alashkert area. The maneuver was not entirely successful, since, having lost up to 3 thousand people captured, the Turks managed to leave the village of Karakilis. By September 15, the 4th Caucasian Corps took up defense from the Mergemir pass to Burnubulakh, setting up a military outpost south of Ardzhish. At the same time, units of the 2nd Turkestan and 1st Caucasian Corps went on the offensive. But due to a lack of ammunition, it was not widely developed, but still pinned down significant Turkish forces. In the Van-Azerbaijan direction, a strike detachment of General Chernozubov operated, which managed to advance 30-35 km. and took up defense from Arjish to the southern shore of Lake Urmia. For successes in operations against Turkish troops, General Yudenich was awarded the Order of St. George, 3rd degree.
Z Then the Caucasian Army was given an important state task - to prevent Iran and Afghanistan from entering the war against Russia. Yudenich's headquarters is developing an operation plan in Northern Iran, which was fully approved by Headquarters. According to this plan, an expeditionary force is created under the command of General Baratov, who has proven himself excellent in previous operations. It consisted of 3 infantry battalions, 39 hundred cavalry, 5 artillery batteries - a total of about 8 thousand people with 20 guns. The corps was transported across the Caspian Sea and landed in the Iranian port of Anzali. After the landing, one part of it was sent to Tehran, and the other to Hamadan and Qom - the main strongholds of the German-Turkish armed detachments. The result of the operation was the defeat of the sabotage detachments, and Hamadan, Qom and some other points were occupied by Russian troops. Thus, attempts by Germany and Turkey to consolidate their influence in Iran and persuade it to war against Russia were thwarted. |
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On the Caucasian front. General N.N. Yudenich (in the middle) in the dugout of the regiment commander at an altitude of 2 ½ versts |
N Beginning in the fall of 1915, troops in the Caucasus moved to actively defend the 1,500-kilometer line. There were not enough people, equipment, or ammunition for offensive operations. In addition, the international situation also changed - Bulgaria entered the war on the side of Germany and Turkey.
B Direct communication was opened between Germany and Turkey, and the Turkish army began to receive a large amount of artillery. In turn, the Turkish command had the opportunity to drive out the Anglo-French troops of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Heavy losses forced the British and French command to abandon the bridgehead.
ABOUT The Turkish command wanted to transfer the freed troops to the 3rd Army, which was fighting Yudenich’s Caucasian Army. Having learned about this, Nikolai Nikolaevich proposed at a military council to launch a general offensive even before the arrival of enemy reinforcements. So far, by this time, according to intelligence data, the Russian army was approximately equal to the Turkish army in infantry, but outnumbered the enemy three times in artillery and five times in regular cavalry.
WITH The silts of both sides were deployed in a strip of more than 400 km from the Black Sea to Lake Van. Turkish formations were mainly concentrated in the Oltyn and Sarykamysh directions and covered the shortest routes to the Erzurum fortress - the most important supply base for troops, a transport communications hub for the northern regions of Turkey. The fortress itself was well protected by mountainous terrain, which made it difficult to carry out large-scale operations there, especially in winter conditions.
T However, the commander of the Caucasian Army and his headquarters were increasingly inclined to go on the offensive no later than the second half of January 1916. The plan for the Erzurum operation was developed - the emphasis was on surprise and thorough preparation of troops.
N The army breakthrough group began the attack. This group, as envisaged by General Yudenich’s plan, entered the battle at dawn on December 30. Its 12 battalions with 18 guns and a hundred under the command of General Voloshin-Petrichenko were given the task of capturing Mount Kuzu-chan, and then attacking the village of Sherbagan and capturing it. In the first five days of January 1916, Russian troops captured Mount Kuzu-chan, the Karachly Pass, the Kalender fortress and a number of other points. The fighting was fierce. The Russians suffered significant losses, their reserves were depleted. The Turks were not in a better position either. By the evening of January 1, Russian intelligence had established that almost all of the reserve units of the 3rd Turkish Army had been brought into the battle to support the first echelons.
5
January The Siberian Cossack Brigade and the 3rd Black Sea Cossack Regiment approached Khasan-Kala. The next day they attacked the Turkish rearguard on the near approaches to the forts of the Erzurum fortifications.
ABOUT again, the Erzurum fortified area was a natural boundary at an altitude of 2200-2400 m above sea level, separating the Passinsky valley from the Erzurum valley. On the mountain ridge there were 11 well-prepared forts, which were located in two lines. Other approaches to the fortress were also covered by separate fortifications. The length of the mountain defensive line was 40 km.
ABOUT It was not possible to take possession of Erzurum right away - a large amount of ammunition was required for the assault. The shortage of rifle cartridges was especially acute. In general, the Erzurum fortress was a fairly extensive fortified position, facing the east with covered flanks. Its weak point was the rear lines. Through them, the city could be blocked by any enemy who penetrated the Erzurum plain.
Sh The staff of the Caucasian Army, and the commander himself personally, began to develop a detailed plan for the assault. Measures were taken to equip the lines with engineering equipment, and at the end of January, reconnaissance on the ground was carried out. All this time, separate reconnaissance detachments carried out raids on enemy locations. They captured individual heights and were firmly fixed on them. Thus, by January 25, Russian units managed to move forward 25-30 km.
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January formations and units of the Caucasian Army took their starting position, and at 2 o'clock in the afternoon the artillery shelling of the fortress began. The Turks resisted desperately, and more than once recaptured the positions occupied by Russian units. The day of February 1 became a turning point in the assault on Turkish fortifications. The Russians captured the last fort, and General Vorobyov's column began to be the first to descend the Erzurum Valley. |
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Heroes of Erzurum. In the middle - Infantry General Yudenich |
IN During the assault on Erzurum, the Primorsky detachment, on the orders of General Yudenich, pinned down the Turks in their direction. From February 5 to 19, the detachment captured the defensive lines along the Archave and Vices rivers, which created a threat to the important enemy stronghold - Trebizond. Success accompanied the detachment, and Trebizond was soon taken. Now the Russian command had the opportunity to establish a naval supply base for the right wing of the Caucasian Army in the port of Trebizond.
T The Urks did not accept the loss of Erzurum, but all their attempts to recapture the fortress failed.
R Russia, England and France secured the results of the latest offensive operations in a secret agreement in April 1916. It noted, in particular, that “...Russia will annex the areas of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis to a to be determined point on the Black Sea coast west of Trebizond. The region of Kurdistan, located south of Van and Bitlis, between Mush, Sort, the course of the Tigris, Jezire Ibn Omar, the line of mountain peaks dominating Amadia and the Mergevere region, will be ceded to Russia ... ". 
P
When developing a plan for military operations in the upcoming 1917 campaign, the Russian command took into account a number of important circumstances - the isolation of the theater of military operations, the difficult situation in the troops, the unique climatic conditions. The army operated in impassable conditions in a hungry region. In 1916 alone, the army lost about 30 thousand people due to typhus and scurvy. In addition, the political situation in the country had to be taken into account. The processes of decomposition of the army began to manifest themselves noticeably. Yudenich proposed at Headquarters to withdraw the Caucasian Army to the main sources of food, positioning it from Erzurum (center) to the border (right flank), but his proposal was not supported.
T when General Yudenich considered it possible to prepare only two private offensive operations by the spring of 1917. The first - in the Mosul direction (7th Caucasian Corps and the consolidated corps of General Baratov), and the second - with formations of the left flank of the army. In other directions it was proposed to conduct an active defense.
IN At the end of January 1917, at the request of the allies, the troops of General Yudenich intensified their actions in the rear of the 6th Turkish Army. Already in February they went on the offensive in the Baghdad and Penjvin directions. Thanks to their successful actions, the British were able to occupy Baghdad at the end of February.
P After the abdication of Nicholas II and the coming to power of the Provisional Government, infantry general N.N. Yudenich was appointed commander of the Caucasian Front (before him, the front was headed by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich). The new commander soon had to face difficulties. Problems began with the supply of food, and the British refused to help their ally in this matter. In addition, Yudenich began to receive numerous telegrams with messages about the creation of soldiers’ committees in units.
YU Denich decides to stop offensive operations from March 6 and switch to positional defense. Troops were sent to better base areas. But the Provisional Government did not support his actions, demanding that the offensive be resumed. Then Yudenich sends to Headquarters a detailed report on the situation in the troops on the Caucasian front and on the possible prospects for the actions of the troops subordinate to him. But this did not satisfy the Headquarters, and in early May N.N. Yudenich was removed from the post of commander as “resisting the instructions of the Provisional Government.”
T So, from an outstanding commander, Yudenich was turned into an outcast. His services in defeating the enemy during the First World War were quickly forgotten. But military successes brought him the respect of his comrades and considerable authority among the Russian public.
IN At the end of May, Nikolai Nikolaevich leaves for Petrograd, and then moves with his family to Moscow.
AND Having a lot of free time, he attended a parade of troops of the Moscow garrison and accidentally heard Kerensky's speech. Then he went to the Alexander School, where he met fellow soldiers.
P disunity and inactivity weighed heavily on him, and in June he went to Headquarters in Mogilev to offer his services as a military specialist. But the veteran’s desire to serve the Fatherland again was needed like no other.
IN In November 1918, Yudenich emigrated to Finland. Here he met with General Mannerheim, whom he knew well from the General Staff Academy. Under the influence of conversations with him, Nikolai Nikolaevich had the idea of organizing a struggle abroad against Soviet power. There were many Russian emigrants in Finland - more than 20 thousand people. Their number included 2.5 thousand Russian officers. From representatives of the tsarist higher bureaucracy, industrialists and financiers who had connections and funds, the Russian Political Committee was formed with a clearly monarchical orientation. He supported the idea of a campaign against revolutionary Petrograd and nominated General Yudenich as the leader of the anti-Soviet movement in the North-West. Under him, the so-called “Political Conference” is created.
P Realizing that it would be very difficult to cope with the Bolsheviks with his existing forces, Yudenich in January 1919 turned to Kolchak with a proposal to unite military forces and asked for help from his Entente allies. Kolchak willingly agreed to cooperate and even sent a million rubles “for the most urgent needs.” Financial and industrial Russian white émigré circles also allocated 2 million rubles to Yudenich.
E This allowed Yudenich to begin forming a White Army in Finland. He had high hopes for the Northern Corps, which, after the defeat at the end of 1918 near Sebezh and Pskov, settled in Estonia. But while Yudenich’s army was being formed, the Northern Corps under the command of General Rodzianko independently launched a campaign against Petrograd and was defeated.
WITH Taking into account the changed situation and at the insistence of Kolchak, on May 24, 1919, Yudenich became the sole commander of all Russian forces in the North-West. The “Northwestern Russian Government” was formed in advance, which was supposed to begin operating immediately after the capture of Petrograd.
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September 1919, Yudenich's army went on the offensive. She broke through the front of the 7th Soviet Army and captured Yamburg, Krasnoe Selo, and Gatchina. But when no more than 20 kilometers remained to Petrograd, the Red Army units launched a counteroffensive. Having received no support from either Finland or Estonia, Yudenich’s army was defeated, and the remnants of the defeated divisions retreated to Estonia, where they were disarmed.
P After the defeat, Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich emigrated to England in a roundabout way. While in exile, he completely abandoned political activity. He died in Cannes at the age of seventy-one on October 5, 1933.
N. Yudenich turned out to be the last commander of the Suvorov school, whose representatives crushed the enemy not with numbers, but with skill. Having learned to take advantage of his every mistake, accurately calculating the direction of the main attack and other conditions for victory, in the Caucasus he led soldiers to the most inaccessible peaks, breathing faith into them.
On October 5, 1933, an unusually large number of Russian military emigrants gathered at the French resort of Cannes. They came here for the funeral of the last truly great commander of the Russian Empire, Infantry General N.N. Yudenich, who died at the age of 71.
Companions in the White movement, the Russian-Japanese and the First World Wars considered it necessary to honor Nikolai Nikolaevich, despite the fact that in exile he lived a solitary, quiet life and did not take part in any significant political event.
In 1927, when influential circles in Great Britain and France discussed the possibility of starting a new military intervention in Soviet Russia, N. Yudenich flatly refused to lead the expeditionary force, which was planned to be formed from members of the Russian All-Military Union. By the way, this was not the first attempt to attract him to participate in a military action, which was supposed to rekindle the flames of civil war in the vastness of Russia. The archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation contain a report from the Foreign Department of the GPU (now declassified) about the meeting of the senior command staff of the Russian Army (evacuated by P. Wrangel from Crimea to the Gallipoli camp in Turkey) held in Belgrade in March 1922, at which decisions were made about the new intervention.
The report, in particular, said: “An invasion of Russia by three groups is planned: the Wrangel group from the south, the “Salvation of the Motherland” group of troops and the Western group under the command of Krasnov. All three groups will be united under a single command... The following command structure is planned for the upcoming operations : Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Temporary Supreme Ruler - Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, his assistant - General Gurko, Chief of Staff - General Miller, Commander-in-Chief - General Yudenich, Chief of Cavalry - General Wrangel..."
As we see, N. Yudenich enjoyed very high military authority in White emigrant circles, otherwise he would not have been assigned the role of commander-in-chief, that is, the actual commander-in-chief of the invasion forces (under the nominal supreme leader, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich). But this appointment was made, we emphasize, in the absence of N. Yudenich, against his will and desire.
Having settled in 1922 on the Mediterranean coast of France, in the small town of Saint-Laurent du Var near the resort of Nice, N. Yudenich REJECTED ALL ATTEMPT OF THE LEADERS OF THE WAR EMIGRATION TO INVOLVE HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERVENTIONIST PLANS.
As Nikolai Nikolayevich himself explained the reasons for his refusal in a conversation with Baron P. Wrangel in 1924, the Russian All-Military Union did not have sufficient forces, equipment, or financial capabilities for a victorious campaign against Soviet Russia, and he had more hopes for the selfless help of the Western allies didn't feed.
N. Yudenich did not succumb to the persuasion of his old friends, generals E.V. Maslovsky (former Quartermaster General of the Caucasian Front headquarters) and V.E. Vyazmitinov (former military and naval minister of the government of Southern Russia) to join the activities of the military part of the white emigration.
It is no coincidence that agents of the KGB foreign intelligence invariably reported to Moscow: “Former white general N. Yudenich has retired from political activities...”
DESCENDANT OF AN ANCIENT GREAT FAMILY
N.N. Yudenich, born in Moscow on July 18, 1862, came from the small nobility of the Minsk province. His distant ancestors were Polish nobles who faithfully served the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its hetmans - the Pototskys, Radziwills, Vishnevetskys. Although none of them held major positions, these dashing warriors took part in many campaigns and always fought valiantly.
After the first partition of Poland during the reign of Catherine II, the Minsk Voivodeship became part of Russia. And the Yudenichs gradually became Russified and married Russian noblewomen. Their descendants, proud of their noble origin, considered themselves natural russians.
The father of the future hero of the Caucasian Front, Nikolai Ivanovich Yudenich (1836-1892), went through the civil service and rose to the rank of collegiate adviser (according to the Table of Ranks, this 6th class rank corresponded to an army colonel).
He often told little Kolya about their genealogy, about the battles and campaigns in which their ancestors took part, and raised his son in the strict conviction that for a nobleman the honor of the family name is above all else; there can be no justification for a bad act that would stain it...
NIKOLAI NIKOLAEVICH WILL REMEMBER THESE LESSONS FOR THE WHOLE LIFE. UNTIL YUDENICH'S DEATH, NEITHER COLLABORATES NOR ENEMIES WOULD RECOGNIZE ANYTHING ABOUT HIM THAT WOULD CAST EVEN THE SMALLEST SHADOW ON HIS REPUTATION AS SPECIFIC IN MATTERS OF HONOR, A CRYSTAL PURE PERSON, ALWAYS READY TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO GOD AND PEOPLE IN KA WAITING FOR THE PERFECT ACTION...
The proximity of his father’s house to the 3rd Alexander Military School, which was located on Znamenka (now this building belongs to the General Staff of the Russian Federation; a memorial plaque on the facade states that G.K. Zhukov once worked here), determined the life choice of Yudenich Jr. From early childhood, he looked at smart cadets with golden monograms on scarlet shoulder straps, involuntarily imitated them and dreamed of becoming a cadet himself, especially since the priest considered a military career as worthy of the title of nobility as possible.
Studying in Aleksandrovka was easy for the smart and purposeful young man, who graduated from the gymnasium with success. And it is not surprising that upon graduation he was among the first in academic performance, having earned the right to choose his military unit.
Second Lieutenant N. Yudenich chose the Life Guards Lithuanian Infantry Regiment - one of the most glorious units of the Russian army, which distinguished itself both in the Patriotic War of 1812 and in the recent Russian-Turkish War of 1877 - 1878. In the summer of 1881, he parted with the Mother See and went to Warsaw, where the Lithuanian regiment, part of the 3rd Guards, was then stationed. infantry division (23rd AK, Warsaw Military District).
However, he did not serve long in the Life Guards. At the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District, he was offered a transfer to the army infantry with a promotion in position and rank. The distant Turkestan, with its difficult climate, did not frighten the young officer; he sincerely wanted to test his strength. But after commanding companies in the 1st Turkestan Rifle and 2nd Khudzhent Reserve Battalions for a couple of years, Lieutenant Nikolai Yudenich received excellent training and the right to take the entrance exams to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff.
It is curious that at the exam in Russian literature, out of 30 topics proposed by Professor Tseshkovsky, he chose not “Napoleon’s entry into Moscow” or, say, “The Capture of the Kars fortress during the Crimean War,” but ... “Romantic movement in Russian literature.” The professor rated N. Yudenich’s essay higher than anyone else in his group and, announcing the grades, added:
- Lieutenant Yudenich, in choosing the topic of your essay, you showed, in my opinion, real courage...
A PERSON'S CHARACTER, AS IS KNOWN, IS SEEN IN THE THINGS. DO NOT SEEK THE EASY WAY, BUT ALWAYS SET A HIGH GOAL FOR YOURSELF, EVEN IT BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE - THIS WILL BECOME NIKOLAI NIKOLAEVICH’S LIFE CREDO, WHICH WILL LEAD HIM TO THE PEAKS OF MILITARY GLORY.
Officers no younger than 18 years old and with ranks no higher than army captain and staff captain of the guard, artillery and sappers could enter the academy. Employees outside St. Petersburg first took a preliminary exam at corps headquarters. At the academy itself, officers wishing to enter the theoretical class had to pass an entrance exam, and for those wishing to enter directly into the practical class, they had to pass both the entrance and transition exam. An officer who wanted to graduate as an external student had to pass a final exam in addition to the two previous exams. Upon completion of the course, the officers were seconded for 1 year to exemplary units to familiarize themselves with the service. The release was made in October. Those who graduated in the 1st category received the next rank, in the 2nd they were graduated with the same rank, and in the 3rd they returned to their units and were not transferred to the General Staff. Army officers were transferred to the General Staff with the same rank, artillerymen, engineers and guardsmen - with promotion (guardsmen still with seniority in the last rank).
Studying at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy could not be considered a pleasant pastime. It was hard work, hard work at times, and it was not without reason that after each transition session, two to three dozen students were mercilessly eliminated, for at least one “failure.”
N. Yudenich learned to fight with the obsession of a born military man. No one from his course, according to the recollections of his colleagues, devoted as much time to classes as he did. Nikolai Nikolayevich did not have any free time left to visit theaters, and even more so restaurants, to all sorts of “windy” entertainment with which St. Petersburg seduced “academics.”
It should be noted that the Russian General Staff Academy in those years was noticeably superior to foreign military schools in terms of education and thoroughness of knowledge. Within its walls, strategy and operational art, work on maps, domestic and foreign weapons (particular attention to the latest artillery systems!), military administration, organization, tactics of action and the history of participation in wars of the armies of leading European powers, and finally, the philosophy of war were deeply studied.
Regarding the last discipline, which studied the basic laws of armed struggle, an ironic poem circulated among the General Staff listeners, the authorship of which was attributed to N. Yudenich:
"A naked troglodyte fought,
How rude natures are,
Now the enlightened Briton
Trembling in khaki before the drill.
But the Englishman and the savage
Store all human properties:
As they beat the face before, of old,
They will beat her like this for a century..."
In 1887, at less than 25 years old, N. Yudenich completed the academic course in the first category (that is, more than successfully) and, assigned to the General Staff, with the rank of captain, was appointed senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 14th Army Corps of the Warsaw Military District.
From November 26, 1887 - senior adjutant of the headquarters of the XIV AK. He served his senior command of the company in the Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment (November 2, 1889 - December 12, 1890).
After 5 years of service on the western borders of the Russian Empire, a transfer to the east followed, and N. Yudenich spent the next 10 years of his service again in Turkestan, successively holding positions from January 27, 1892 - senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District. Lieutenant Colonel (art. April 5, 1892). In 1894 he participated in the Pamir expedition as chief of staff of the Pamir detachment.
Colonel since 1896. From September 20, 1900 - headquarters officer under the control of the 1st Turkestan Rifle Brigade.
Lieutenant General V. Filatiev, who knew him well in those years, would later write in his memoirs how he remembered the character traits of this officer: “DIRECTNESS AND EVEN SHARPENESS OF JUDGMENTS, DETERMINITY OF DECISIONS AND FIRMITY IN DEFENDING HIS OPINION AND A COMPLETE LACK OF INTENTION TO ANY COMPROMISE... "
ON THE HILLS OF MANCHURI
Colonel N. Yudenich received his baptism of fire during the Russo-Japanese War.
Two years before it began, he was transferred from Turkestan to the Vilna Military District, to command the 18th Infantry Regiment (07/16/1902-06/19/1905). This regiment was included in the 5th Rifle Brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division and made a long journey to the theater of operations across all of Russia - first along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and then on foot marches.
By that time, Nikolai Nikolaevich had found family happiness. His wife Alexandra Nikolaevna, a representative of the noble family of the Zhemchugovs, connected her life with him, as they say, to the grave; Their marriage became strong thanks to mutual love and wonderful mutual understanding, so that no trials were afraid of him...
N. Yudenich's regiment was rightfully considered one of the best in the Russian army. At field exercises, reviews and maneuvers, his soldiers demonstrated remarkable combat training and that special dash of courage that from time immemorial accompanies true military professionals who have learned to despise death.
The inspectors also praised the colonel for the well-organized life of his unit: the patients in the infirmary could be counted on the fingers of one hand; the barracks were distinguished by their quality and comfort; the kitchen farm supplied the soldiers' table with fresh meat and vegetables. Each company had its own shoemakers, tailors, and hairdressers. The regiment commander was often seen in position on the rise and during the release; out of habit, preserved from the time he commanded a company, he knew many of the soldiers by their first and last names and loved to ask what they were writing from home.
N. Yudenich took a sample of the soldiers' food himself. And I always dealt harshly with non-commissioned officers who committed assault. But he did not forget to instruct junior commanders in a fatherly way:
- The lower rank is your brother. Treat him accordingly. Strictly, demanding, but fair. Support the new recruit whenever you feel they are having a hard time. Don’t forget that you and the soldier will not only keep the barracks clean, but also go into battle side by side...
When the military echelon of the 18th Infantry Regiment passed through Moscow, Colonel N. Yudenich was given a small folding icon with images of the Savior, the Mother of God and St. George the Victorious for military happiness. They asked to take care of yourself, but at the same time remember your duty...
But then the conductor's whistle sounded. Harmonicas blared in the carriages, and the young voices of the recruit boys chanted:
"The last day today
I'm walking with you, friends.
And tomorrow is early, it’s barely light,
My whole family will cry..."
Upon arrival in Manchuria, N. Yudenich’s rifle regiment, without spending a day in the army reserve, immediately found itself in the thick of hostilities. The riflemen either made long marches across complete off-road terrain, counting it luck to find a roof for the night in some Chinese village, surrounded like a fortress by a clay fence, or they dug into the ground like moles, digging kilometers of human-sized trenches and already knowing in advance that they would soon will have to leave, perhaps without even fighting the Japanese...
It is noteworthy that no matter how the situation developed, Colonel N. Yudenich in defense always paid special attention to the best arrangement of his firing line. While one battalion began to dig communication passages and trenches, he placed the other battalion in front of him and said:
- In front of us is a field of not yet mown kaoliang. This is bad…
One day a young officer hurried to clarify:
“Kaoliang hasn’t ripened, it’s too early to harvest.” This is what the village elder said...
“Then we will have to remove the corpses of our soldiers,” the regimental commander objected to the “humanist.” - You fight, not the Chinese! Therefore, I order that the gaoliang blocking the view from our positions be immediately destroyed!
The battalion of riflemen lined up in a chain and, armed with knives and cutlasses, moved forward, chopping, trampling and compacting the thick stems of kaoliang, which grew as tall as a man. After this, it was no longer possible for the Japanese infantry to covertly approach the positions of N. Yudenich’s regiment...
Alas, during that war there was no trace of the Suvorov spirit in the actions and decisions of the top leaders of the Russian army. N. Yudenich, as an experienced General Staff officer, clearly saw that such military leaders as corps commanders Gripenberg and Stackelberg were no good. But the real tragedy was that any, even the most reasonable initiative of mid-level commanders (at the level of regiments and divisions) was not welcomed by the Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General A.N. Kuropatkin and his staff. In more than one battle, Nikolai Nikolaevich felt tied hand and foot. More than once he indignantly said to his comrades in arms:
- How can I fight if to attack not even with the whole regiment, but with only one battalion, I have to ask permission almost from A. Kuropatkin every time? And how can I encourage company and battalion commanders if we are not allowed to take the initiative at all?
Until the end of his days, he did not forget how he sent a report to the corps headquarters with a request to allow him, with one rifle battalion and a machine gun team, to attack the Japanese who had occupied the village of Thoudoluzi at night. The moment was right for a surprise attack - the spy reported that part of the enemy infantry was sent to the line of the Manchurian Railway, and the Japanese did not cover the approaches to the village with anything, apparently without fear of a night attack by the cautious Russians... But from the corps headquarters they sent the following answer (with taking into account the capabilities available to the Russians) today it would be fitting to include in a textbook on the art of war as an example of the blatant tactical illiteracy of other would-be commanders:
“I don’t allow Thoudoluzi to attack at night. You risk losing a lot of people lost and cut off from your own people. Take care of your people. Don’t get involved in random battles.”
These were the “commanders” who led military operations on the fields of Manchuria, suffering one defeat after another. As for the advice to “take care of people,” N. Yudenich always did this without any reminders, but at the same time he tried to beat the enemy. And if he scattered his strength, forgot to be careful, then Nikolai Nikolaevich always considered it an unforgivable sin for a combat commander to miss such a chance to clean up his face, and with minimal losses on his part...
Participation in the Battle of Mukden, which took place from February 6 to 25, 1905, was included in the chronicle of the exploits of the 18th Infantry Regiment and the biography of its commander. It brought the colonel the glory of a rising star in the horizon of Russian military leadership, which had become rather dim by the beginning of the 20th century.
In this battle, the 18th Infantry was among those troops on the right flank of A. Kuropatkin, who were hit by the Japanese 3rd Army of General M. Nogi, who was making a roundabout maneuver with the goal of reaching the Russian rear north of Mukden and cutting the railway and tracks there departure to the north.
On February 19, the 5th and 8th Japanese infantry divisions went on the offensive in the Madyapu-Yansyntun sector. Yudenich's fighters set up field positions on the outskirts of Yangsyntun, a large Chinese village, and opened trenches in the fields of Chumiza and Kaoliang. It was here at dawn that a horse messenger delivered a note from the divisional headquarters from General Bilderling: “The enemy with a force of more than two infantry divisions is advancing along the Liaohe Valley. The Japanese have already reached our flank. In the event of an attack on your position, the regiment is ordered to hold it. I rely on your firmness and courage riflemen. I can’t reinforce them with reserves.”
However, Nikolai Nikolaevich did not count on help from Bilderling and created his own reserve in advance - a rifle company with two machine-gun crews. In the most extreme case, rear units were also ready to join the ranks: several dozen baggage carriers, bakers, cooks, etc. All of them wielded a rifle and bayonet no worse than infantrymen of line companies - this is how combat training was structured in the 18th Infantry Regiment in peacetime ...
The Japanese appeared in front of the positions of N. Yudenich's regiment late in the evening.
They acted confidently, clearly knowing the location of the Russian positions. Later, Nikolai Nikolaevich at a meeting at corps headquarters will talk about this problem:
- The samurai widely use spies, and they, under the guise of peaceful Chinese, roam freely through the areas we occupy. And the shooters don’t know how to spot the spy. There is a great need for field counterintelligence officers in the regiments...
Since there were catastrophically few personnel gendarmes assigned to the troops in Manchuria, he will propose that soldiers from the Trans-Amur Border Guard Corps, trained to distinguish Honghuz robbers from ordinary peasants, be distributed among regiments and given the task of searching for Japanese agents. This proposal of N. Yudenich will be met with approval and will serve an important service...
And on that memorable evening of the Battle of Mukden, the vanguard battalion of General Nogi’s troops suddenly attacked the positions of the 18th Infantry. Usually the Japanese sent forward a small detachment (a platoon, rarely a company) to test the density of Russian fire. And then immediately, from behind the fans, thick chains of enemy infantry stretched out...
The secrets placed in front of our trenches, without accepting battle, retreated to their own. Soon, a terrifying multi-voiced cry of “banzai” rushed over the field, with which the Japanese encouraged themselves as they rushed into attacks. The Russian infantry met the advancing enemy lines with bursts of rifle fire and machine-gun bursts. Unable to resist under heavy Russian fire, the samurai retreated back, taking the wounded with them. But after that, the Japanese artillery, pulled up from the depths, began to methodically cover our front edge with “shimoza”, and it was felt that its outline and the location of the firing points had been explored in advance...
The main events unfolded over the next 24 hours. Samurai attacks and counterattacking throws by Siberian riflemen alternated throughout the day. Yudenich even lost count of the enemy attacks, and if it were not for the regimental clerk, who recorded each enemy attack in the draft combat report, it would have been difficult to reconstruct the exact number of them later. Under the cover of barrage fire, one wave of Japanese after another attempted to capture Russian positions, clearly hoping to crush them with numerical superiority.
When the enemy launched another frontal attack with the usual forces of one or two battalions, unexpectedly for the Siberian riflemen, exhausted from fatigue, another enemy chain crawled out from the right flank, from the ravine. N. Yudenich had only two flank companies holding the defense here, which were already pretty thin. Feeling that the enemy could knock them out of position and bypass his regiment, Nikolai Nikolaevich himself led his reserve company, adding rear soldiers to it, and personally led them into a counterattack.
The flank companies holding the defense, inspired by the general impulse, also rushed forward along with the help that arrived in time. Shouts of “Hurray” and “Banzai” interspersed with desperate swearing, the clanking of bayonets, the clicking of bolts and the sounds of shots merged into one incessant roar that stood over the field, where thousands of people on both sides were locked in desperate hand-to-hand combat. In that clash, N. Yudenich fired all the cartridges from his revolver. The riflemen defended him with bayonets from the cutlasses of Japanese soldiers who were trying to gain glory for themselves by stabbing the Russian commander. In the end, ours took it - the Japanese first began to back away, and then ran together... It took a lot of work for the company commanders to stop their soldiers from pursuing, which could lead to a trap, and return them to their original position, following the order of the regimental commander...
That day of the Mukden battle ended with several more Russian counterattacks, which also developed into hand-to-hand combat. Artillery reconnaissance officers, sent to the first line of Siberian riflemen, adjusted the fire of their batteries, ensuring the destruction of enemy personnel. The Japanese were driven out of several villages by shrapnel and bayonets, and they hurried to flee to the Liaohe River valley. General Nogi - perhaps the best commander of the Mikado - in a report to Tokyo would later be forced to admit that the Russians showed unprecedented stamina and determination during the defense of Yangsyntun, and they were commanded by mature and brave commanders, which is why he was unable to carry out his plan to encircle and destroy Russian army in the Battle of Mukden...
For holding the Yangsyntun position, Colonel N. Yudenich was awarded the St. George weapon - a golden saber with the inscription “For bravery.” This blade will be with him in the next two wars - the First World War and the Civil War... And besides this, for the Russian-Japanese War he will be awarded two orders: St. Vladimir, 3rd degree with swords and St. Stanislav, also with swords, but immediately the highest , 1st degree. And all the lower ranks of his 18th Infantry Regiment, soldiers and non-commissioned officers, will be awarded by the highest decree an award badge on a headdress with a special (only for them!) inscription: “For Yangsyntun. February 1905.”
In the battle of Sandepu, where he was wounded in the arm, and the Battle of Mukden, in which he was wounded in the neck. He was awarded the Golden Arms of St. George “for bravery” and promoted to major general.
From February 10, 1907 - Quartermaster General of the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District. Lieutenant General (1912). Since 1912 - chief of staff of the Kazan, and since 1913 - of the Caucasian military district.
"WE ARE RUSSIANS! WE WILL OVERCOME EVERYTHING!"
Since the beginning of the First World War, Yudenich became the chief of staff of the Caucasian Army, which fought battles with the troops of the Ottoman Empire. At this post, he completely defeated the Turkish troops under the command of Enver Pasha in the Battle of Sarykamysh.
In the Sarykamysh operation of the Caucasian Army under the command of N. Yudenich, carried out from December 9 (22), 1914 to January 5 (18), 1915, the main forces of the Turkish 3rd Army were defeated, surrounded and captured.
For Sarykamysh, promoted to infantry general, N. Yudenich received an order
St. George of the fourth degree. This decisive victory allowed Russian troops to conduct military operations only in Turkey from the beginning of 1915.
Of course, the Ottoman command, fueled by Berlin and Vienna, hoped to take revenge and wrest the strategic initiative from the “infidels.” The new commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General Mahmud Kemal Pasha, energetically took up the preparation of a new offensive, especially since the experienced German General Staff G. Guse was sent to him as chief of staff. This student of the ever-memorable General Ludendorff developed a plan to cut off the extended Russian communications running along the Northern Euphrates valley. This goal was served by a blow in the Melazgert direction on the flank of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps, which was delivered on July 9, 1915 by 80 Ottoman battalions and squadrons.
Turkish sabotage and terrorist groups began to actively operate in the rear of this formation, relying on the support of local Muslim fanatics. Under these conditions, the corps commander, Infantry General V.V. de Witt appealed to the commander with a request to allow him to withdraw troops to a line north of the Alashkert Valley. To weaken the Ottoman pressure on de Witt’s corps, N. Yudenich quickly formed a consolidated detachment under the command of General N.N. Baratov (24 infantry battalions, 36 hundred cavalry and about 40 guns) and struck back at them in the rear of the enemy. This maneuver was not a complete success - the high mountains and destroyed bridges slowed down the advance of the Baratov warriors.
But N. Yudenich supplemented their attack with private offensives on other sectors of the front, trying to fetter the activity of Kemal Pasha and not allow him to transfer new forces to the Alashkert Valley. Thus, a detachment of military foreman Chernozubov (8 militia squads and 48 Cossack hundreds with 20 guns) advanced 35 - 40 km and took up defense in a 400 km zone from Ardzhish to the southern coast of Lake Urmia. So the Caucasian army was able to prevent a widespread enemy offensive. Its commander received a well-deserved reward for this success - the Order of St. George, 3rd degree.
“General Yudenich had extraordinary civic courage, composure in the most difficult moments and determination,” the former Quartermaster General of his staff, General V.E. Maslovsky, reflected years later on the components of Nikolai Nikolaevich’s military leadership talent, General V.E. Maslovsky. “He always found the courage to make the right decision, taking upon himself all responsibility for it... He had an indestructible will. General Yudenich was completely imbued with the determination to win at any cost, the will to win, and this will of his, combined with the properties of his mind and character, revealed in him the true traits of a commander." .
Since the autumn of 1915, the small Caucasian army was forced to maintain a front 1500 km long. The situation was complicated by the fact that Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the German bloc, opening its territory for direct communication to Turkey from Germany, from where trains with weapons and ammunition poured in for the Ottomans. And the British-French allies suffered a crushing defeat in the Dardanelles operation, which freed up the forces of an entire army of Turks to transfer them to the Caucasus. Under these conditions, N. Yudenich decided to defeat the 3rd Turkish Army again, without waiting for it to strengthen with reinforcements moving from the Gallipoli Peninsula. While equal in infantry (approximately 130 battalions each), the Caucasian Army outnumbered the enemy in artillery (three times) and regular cavalry (five times). It was on these advantages that Nikolai Nikolaevich built his strategy. He decided to carry out a large-scale offensive operation in the harsh winter, breaking through the enemy’s defenses in three operational directions at once - Erzerum, Oltin and Bitlis. The main blow was delivered in the direction of the village of Keprikey.
Preparations for the offensive in the mountains of Turkish Armenia were particularly thorough. First of all, the commander took all measures to provide the soldiers with warm clothing. Each warrior received a pair of felt boots and warm foot wraps, a short sheepskin coat, trousers quilted with cotton wool, a hat with a turning back, and mittens. For camouflage in the snow-capped mountains, a sufficient number of white calico robes and white cap covers were prepared.
The personnel of the 1st Caucasian Corps (which was to advance in the highlands) all received protective sunglasses. And since the area of the upcoming actions was also treeless, which means that the preparation of firewood on the spot became impossible, each soldier went on a campaign, having with him two logs for heating at night. The equipment of the advancing infantry companies prudently included thick poles and boards for quickly establishing crossings across non-freezing mountain streams. N. Yudenich took into account the experience of the Sarykamysh operation: thousands of Turkish soldiers were then out of action, suffering from frostbite due to wet shoes... Finally, in order not to get into trouble with the weather, 17 meteorological stations were deployed in the zone of the impending offensive of the Caucasian Army, which regularly issued forecasts to the troops and recommendations.
The operational camouflage of the impending offensive of the Caucasian soldiers, carried out according to the plan of the army headquarters, is also worthy of careful study. Thus, Russian front-line intelligence officers operating on the other side spread a rumor about an operation allegedly planned for the early spring of 1916 by the Van-Azerbaijan detachment and the expeditionary force of General Baratov, which entered Iran, together with the British in Mesopotamia.
In Iranian Azerbaijan, the Baratov Cossacks purchased a large number of camels and whole herds of livestock, procured large quantities of grain and fodder, which served as indirect confirmation of preparation for a large campaign between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. And when the Turkish radio interception service (created by German instructors) intercepted an unencrypted urgent radiogram from N. Yudenich to the commander of the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division with an order to concentrate at Sarykamysh for further shipment by rail to Persia, from the Ottoman commander Kemal Pasha and his German consultant Heinrich Guza did not have the slightest doubt that the Russians really intended to move to Mesopotamia... By the way, one rifle regiment of the 4th division was indeed transferred to the border Julfa and, after unloading, made a demonstrative daily transition. Other steps were also taken to mislead the Turkish command.
The operation to disinform the enemy, carried out by N. Yudenich and his headquarters, brought remarkable results: the offensive launched on December 28, 1915 by the 2nd Turkestan Corps took the Turks by surprise. On the very first day their front was broken through. Strong enemy fortifications on the ridge of Mount Gey-Dag were taken on the move by a combined attack of two divisions. And the left flank of the corps, with access to the Karach-ly pass, suddenly turned west for the Turks, creating a threat of envelopment. On January 9, 1916, Turkestan warriors with a swift attack captured a strong enemy position at Kizil-kilis and three days later besieged the Kara-gyubek fortress, which closed the Gurjibogaz pass, which leads to the Erzurum plateau.
In the Keprikey direction, the army breakthrough group entered the battle on December 30. In the Araks River valley, the Turks offered stubborn resistance to the attackers. But since the offensive, according to the operational plan approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was launched in three directions at once, it was difficult for Kemal Pasha to maneuver his reserves, and soon he could no longer fend off the Russian attacks.
During January 5-6, the Siberian and Kuban Cossacks broke through to the forts of the Erzurum fortress, and on January 7 our infantry arrived here. Taking Erzurum on the move was very tempting, but unlikely: the fortress was a complex system of modern engineering structures built on hills and ridges of heights, protected by ditches and gorges. 80 battalions of Ottoman infantry, which had powerful artillery - over 300 barrels, settled in the forts and citadels. The Russians drove the Turks out of the surrounding villages and, under the cover of night darkness, moved their trenches and communication trenches ever closer to the forts.
N. Yudenich, who arrived at the walls of the fortress after a thorough reconnaissance, nevertheless, on January 27, gave the order to prepare for the assault. This was a very responsible decision, because in case of failure the situation on the Caucasian front could change sharply for the worse...
Employee of the intelligence department of the field headquarters of the Caucasian Army, Lieutenant Colonel B.A. Shteifon, who participated in the preparation of the assault on the Erzurum fortress, subsequently noted: “In fact, every bold maneuver of General N. Yudenich is a consequence of a deeply thought-out and absolutely accurately guessed situation... The risk of General N. Yudenich is the courage of creative imagination, the courage that is inherent only in great commanders."
The assault began on January 29 at 2 p.m. It involved 88 infantry battalions, 70 Cossack hundreds, 166 guns, 50 field howitzers and 16 heavy siege mortars. Using well-placed (according to the commander's plan) artillery batteries, the assaulters attacked enemy forts behind a curtain of fire. On the first day of the operation, it was possible to capture the northern part of the positions from which the Gurjibogaz Passage was controlled, as well as the Dalan-gez fort.
This fort was occupied by an infantry detachment and Cossacks under the command of Lieutenant Colonel I.N. Pirumova. On the morning of February 1, the Turks began a fierce shelling of the lost fort, and then threw superior infantry forces against it. The defenders of Dalan-gez were cut off from their own, and ammunition was running out. They repulsed five fierce attacks of the Ottomans with rifle and machine-gun fire, the sixth and seventh with bayonets alone, and the situation was so tragic that even the wounded stood in formation. When the eighth attack began, our reinforcements arrived. By this time, out of one and a half battalions of the 153rd Infantry Regiment (1,400 people) defending the fort, no more than 300 people remained in the ranks, and most of them were wounded...
The turning point occurred on February 1, when the Russian infantry took by storm the last of the forts blocking the Gurdjiboghaz passage, after which the Cossacks thrown into the breakthrough broke into the Erzurum Valley. Kemal Pasha concentrated his efforts on defending the Deveboyn position, but Yudenich’s warriors swept away this obstacle as well.
On February 7, Erzurum fell. 137 officers and up to 8 thousand ordinary askers surrendered, three hundred Ottoman guns became war trophies. In a city engulfed in flames, the commander personally presented awards to the heroes of the assault. More than a hundred lower ranks received from his hands “soldier’s” St. George’s crosses, and he awarded colonels Gabaev and Fisenko, Lieutenant Colonel Vorobyov, Staff Captain Zapolsky and a number of other officers with orders. Nikolai Nikolaevich himself, as stated in the imperial decree, “in reward for the excellent execution, under exceptional circumstances, of a brilliant military operation that ended with the storming of the Deveboyn position and the Erzerum fortress on February 2, 1916,” was awarded the high military order of St. George 2 -th degree (he was the last of the Russian military leaders to receive such an award).
After capturing the Erzurum stronghold, the Caucasian Army pursued the remnants of the completely defeated 3rd Turkish Army. On February 17, the 4th Caucasian Corps took the large city of Bitlis. At the same time, the Russian Primorsky detachment, having broken through enemy positions along the Arachva and Vitsis rivers, reached the distant approaches to the important Turkish port of Trebizond, which was soon also taken...
Kersnovsky, in his historical work, gave the following assessment of the strategic results of the activities of N. Yudenich the commander in the Caucasian theater: “Enver’s army was crushed and destroyed by Yudenich at Sarykamysh. The dreams of creating a “Panturan” kingdom from Adrianople to Kazan and Samarkand came to an end.
In the summer of 1915, N. Yudenich defeated the Turks who were trying to advance on the Euphrates. In the fall, the Turks defeated the Anglo-French in the Dardanelles. Knowing that the enemy must strengthen, but they would not give him reinforcements, N. Yudenich decided not to wait for the blow, but to strike himself. In the midst of the icy Caucasian winter, he launched a surprise offensive, defeated the Turkish army at Azap-Key, and then, at his own peril and risk, took Erzurum by storm, unprecedented in history...
By the end of 1916, the Caucasian Army had accomplished everything that Russia demanded of it during this war. It was up to the Constantinople landing. The living force of the Turkish army was already crushed..."
The Caucasian army of General N. Yudenich advanced 150 km. The Turkish 3rd Army was completely defeated. It lost more than half of its strength: 66 thousand people were killed and wounded, 13 thousand were captured. 9 banners and 323 guns were also taken. The Russian army lost 2339 killed and 6 thousand wounded. The capture of Erzurum opened the way for the Russians to Trebizond (Trabzon), which was taken in April, and later, in July, Erzincan was taken. The Russian army advanced deeply into the territory of Turkish Armenia.
After the February Revolution of 1917, N. Yudenich was appointed commander of the Caucasian Front. However, after the resignation of A.I. Guchkov as Minister of War on May 2 (15), 1917, the new Minister of War A.F. Kerensky removed Yudenich from his post as resisting the instructions of the Provisional Government and sent him into retirement.
Having left Tiflis, N. Yudenich settled in Petrograd. According to the recollections of N. Yudenich’s wife Alexandra Nikolaevna, N. Yudenich once went to the bank to take some amount of money from his savings. Bank employees, recognizing him, advised him to immediately take all the money in his hands and sell the property. The Yudenichs sold their house in Tiflis and land in Kislovodsk. These funds provided them for some time ahead, capturing the beginning of emigration.
In August 1917, Yudenich participated in the work of the State Conference; supported the Kornilov speech.
After the October Revolution, N. Yudenich lived illegally in Petrograd, hiding on the top floor in the house of the Russian Insurance Company on the Petrograd Side, under the protection of a janitor, a former sergeant major of the Lithuanian Life Guards Regiment, who served with N. Yudenich back in the Pamir expedition of 1904- 1905
His political program after the establishment of Bolshevik power was based on the idea of reconstructing “One, Great and Indivisible Russia” within its historical territory; at the same time, for tactical purposes, the possibility of granting cultural-national autonomy and even state independence to the outlying peoples was proclaimed if they joined the fight against the Bolsheviks.
In January 1919, N. Yudenich, using documents in someone else’s name, together with his wife and adjutant N. A. Pokotilo crossed the Finnish border and arrived in Helsingfors (Helsinki). The "Russian Committee", created there in November 1918 and claiming to be the Russian government, proclaimed him in January 1919 the leader of the White movement in North-West Russia, giving him dictatorial powers. N. Yudenich managed to establish contact with A. Kolchak in Siberia and the Russian Political Conference in Paris. N. Yudenich himself said best about the goals of the military force he created:
THE RUSSIAN WHITE GUARD HAS ONE GOAL - TO EXPEL THE BOLSHEVIKS FROM RUSSIA. THE GUARD DOES NOT HAVE A POLITICAL PROGRAM. SHE IS NEITHER MONARCHIC AND NOT REPUBLICAN. AS A MILITARY ORGANIZATION, IT IS NOT INTERESTED IN ISSUES OF POLITICAL PARTY. HER ONLY PROGRAM IS DOWN WITH THE BOLSHEVIKS!
In the spring of 1919, Yudenich visited Stockholm, where he met with diplomatic representatives of England, France and the United States, trying to get help in the formation of Russian volunteer detachments in Finland. Apart from the French envoy, who agreed with Yudenich's view, all other envoys spoke out against interference in Russia's internal affairs.
On May 5, upon returning from Stockholm to Finland, Yudenich met with the Regent of Finland, General Mannerheim, for the same purpose. Without abandoning in principle the idea of the participation of the Finnish army in the fight against the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim put forward a number of conditions, under which it would be easier for him to obtain permission from the Finnish Sejm for such participation - the main thing is recognition of the independence of Finland, as well as the annexation of Eastern Karelia and the Pechenga region to Finland on the shore of the Kola Peninsula. Although Yudenich himself understood that “the independence of Finland is an accomplished fact” and that in relations with Finland it was necessary to make concessions in order to receive help from it in the fight against Bolshevism, he was unable to persuade either Kolchak or Sazonov, who stood on principles of "non-decision". As a result, the Finnish authorities not only did not allow the formation of units from Russian volunteers, but also prevented officers who wanted to join the Northern Corps from sailing legally from Finland to Estonia.
Back on April 17, 1919, the All-Russian Government of Admiral A. Kolchak allocated 10 million francs to Yudenich. The money took a long time to come; the Russian diplomatic representative in Stockholm received the first million only in June. On May 24, in Helsingfors, N. Yudenich created and headed the “Political Conference”. Its members included A. V. Kartashev, P. K. Kondzerovsky, V. D. Kuzmin-Karavaev, S. G. Lianozov, G. A. Danilevsky.
On June 5, 1919, the Supreme Ruler Admiral A. Kolchak notified N. Yudenich by telegram of his appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of all Russian ground and naval armed forces against the Bolsheviks on the North-Western Front,” and on June 10 the telegram was confirmed by an official Decree.
Having received a telegram from A. Kolchak, N. Yudenich left for Revel, and from there to the front of the North-Western Army, led by General N. Rodzianko. Having toured the army, N. Yudenich returned to Helsingfors on June 26, still trying to gain support from Finland. However, after Mannerheim approved the new Finnish constitution on July 17, Professor Stolberg became President of Finland on July 25, and Mannerheim went abroad. Hope for help from Finland was gone, and on July 26 N. Yudenich departed by ship for Revel.
Despite the dissatisfaction of the “Estonian group” of senior officers, who saw Yudenich and his entourage from Finland as “strangers who arrived ready-made,” Yudenich was accepted as a guarantee of receiving material assistance from the allies. As General Yaroslavtsev, one of the commanders of the Northwestern Army, wrote in his memoirs.
During August, Yudenich successfully dealt with army supply issues. At the same time, paper banknotes in denominations of 25 and 50 kopecks, 1, 3, 5, 10, 25, 100, 500 and 1000 rubles were prepared (and put into circulation at the beginning of the campaign). On the reverse side of these bills there was an inscription stating that they were subject to exchange for national Russian money in the manner and within the time frame determined by the Petrograd office of the State Bank.
In fact, it was a kind of visual propaganda: everyone who received such bills as payment had to understand that they would become real money only if Petrograd was captured by the troops of N. Yudenich.
In September-October 1919, N. Yudenich organized a second campaign against Petrograd. On September 28, the relatively well-trained North-Western Army, which consisted of 4 armored trains, 4 armored cars and 6 English-made tanks, together with Estonian troops, broke through the defenses of the Red Army; On October 12, Yamburg fell, in the second half of October the North-Western Army captured Luga, Gatchina, Krasnoye Selo, Tsarskoye Selo and Pavlovsk. By mid-October, the Whites reached the nearest approaches to Petrograd (Pulkovo Heights).
However, they failed to cut the Nikolaev railway, which allowed Trotsky to freely transfer reinforcements to Petrograd and create a multiple superiority of the Reds over the enemy. The Finns and the British did not provide effective assistance to the attackers.
Friction increased with the Estonians, who were frightened by the great power aspirations of N. Yudenich and to whom the Bolsheviks promised significant political and territorial concessions. The lack of reserves and the stretched front of the North-Western Army allowed the Red Army to stop the White advance on October 21, and to break through their defenses on October 22. By the end of November, N. Yudenich’s troops were pressed to the border and crossed into Estonian territory, where they were disarmed and interned by their former allies.
On January 22, 1920, N. Yudenich announced the dissolution of the North-Western Army. A Liquidation Commission was formed, to which Yudenich transferred his remaining £227,000. On January 28, Yudenich was arrested by soldiers of the Bulak-Balakhovich formation with the assistance of the Estonian authorities, but was released after the intervention of the French and English missions.
On February 24, 1920, N. Yudenich left Estonia in the carriage of the English military mission together with generals Glazenap, Vladimirov and G. A. Aleksinsky and on February 25 arrived in Riga.
It is not surprising that even the failure of the North-Western Army’s offensive on Petrograd in 1919 did not shake the prevailing opinion among Russian officers and generals that WHERE N. YUDENICH IS, THERE IS VICTORY...
AND IF YOU DO NOT CONSIDER ALEXEY BRUSILOV, WHO SERVED IN THE RED ARMY IN THEIR END OF YEARS, NIKOLAI YUDENICH ACTUALLY TURNED OUT TO BE THE LAST COMMANDER OF THE SUVOROV SCHOOL, WHICH REPRESENTATIVES SMASHED THE ENEMY NOT IN NUMBER, BUT IN SKILL. HAVING LEARNED TO USE HIS EVERY MISSION, ACCURATELY CALCULATING THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF VICTORY, IN THE CAUCASUS HE LEADED THE SOLDIERS TO THE MOST INCREASABLE PEAKS, BREATHING FAITH INTO THEM.
In exile in France
N. Yudenich went to London through Stockholm and Copenhagen. While in London, N. Yudenich did not speak publicly and refused to meet with reporters. The only person to whom N. Yudenich paid a visit was Winston Churchill.
Then N. Yudenich moved to France and settled in Nice, buying a house in the Nice suburb of Saint-Laurent-du-Var.
In emigration he completely withdrew from political activity.
He took part in the work of Russian educational organizations; headed the Society of Devotees of Russian History. P. A. Tomilov, E. V. Maslovsky, P. N. Lomnovsky, D. G. Shcherbachev, V. K. Pilkin, who lived in Nice, visited the Yudenichs’ house.
Died of pulmonary tuberculosis. He was buried first in the Lower Church in Cannes, but subsequently his coffin was transferred to Nice to the Cocade cemetery.
